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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 58Abstract
We study how determinacy and learnability of global rational ex-
pectations equilibrium may be aﬀected by monetary policy in a sim-
ple, two country, New Keynesian framework. The two blocks may be
viewed as the U.S. and Europe, or as regions within the euro zone. We
seek to understand how monetary policy choices may interact across
borders to help or hinder the creation of a unique rational expecta-
tions equilibrium worldwide which can be learned by market partic-
ipants. We study cases in which optimal policies are being pursued
country by country as well as some forms of cooperation. We ﬁnd
that open economy considerations may alter conditions for determi-
nacy and learnability relative to closed economy analyses, and that
new concerns can arise in the analysis of classic topics such as the de-
sirability of exchange rate targeting and monetary policy cooperation.
Keywords: Indeterminacy, monetary policy rules, new open economy
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April 2006Non-technical summary
In the workhorse New Keynesian macroeconomic model, whether the
rational expectations equilibrium is unique or not may be signiﬁcantly in-
ﬂuenced by monetary policy choices. Policymakers that implement policy
which conforms to the Taylor principle–that is, policy reacts suﬃciently
aggressively to both inﬂation and real developments in the economy–can
often ensure that the rational expectations equilibrium is unique. Policy-
makers that fail to adhere to this principle by being too passive can cause
the same economy to possess a continuum of equilibria. All of these equilibria
are equally consistent with rational expectations, but generally have higher
variance, possibly much higher variance, than the unique equilibrium asso-
ciated with the more aggressive policy. The high variance equilibria come
from volatile, but still rational, expectations, and are to be avoided both
according to the model and according to practical ideas about policymaking.
The general conclusion for the closed economy has been that monetary pol-
icy should be appropriately aggressive in reacting to economic developments
in order to keep expectations well-anchored, thus avoiding the unpleasant
volatile equilibria that could otherwise exist.
How might this policy recommendation be aﬀected when one turns to the
open economy environment? Our primary concern in this paper is to provide
an analysis of this question.
Extensions of the New Keynesian macroeconomic model to the open econ-
omy have recently been developed. We adopt one of these, a simple frame-
work for a two-country world due to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). This
framework allows comparison to the more common single country and small
open economy analyses as special cases. The model has a natural separation
between countries: Roughly, after making certain adjustments to parame-
ters accounting for the degree of openness of each economy, this version of
the open economy New Keynesian macroeconomic model is qualitatively the
same as the standard closed economy model. We exploit this feature exten-
sively in this paper. We show that the nature of monetary policy in each
country can lead to more or less international feedback, and complicate or
5
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April 2006simplify the conditions under which monetary policy aﬀects the uniqueness
and learnability of rational expectations equilibrium.
We consider both instrument rules and targeting rules. The instrument
rules we study are Taylor-type policy rules in which the monetary authority
reacts to deviations of inﬂation from target and deviations of output from
potential, and possibly to other, international variables, when setting their
nominal interest rate target. Instrument rules have no claim to optimality,
but are thought to be a type of robust policy that would work reasonably well
even if the large degree of model uncertainty is taken into account. Targeting
rules represent optimal policy given an objective assigned to the central bank,
and so are ﬁnely calibrated to the details of the particular model under study.
Targeting rules give a better idea of the nature of optimal policy in the model
at hand, but may not describe actual policy or perform well should the model
environment change.
We are able to show how the conditions for uniqueness of rational ex-
pectations equilibrium, and the learnability of that equilibrium, depend on
the nature of monetary policy in each country. One interesting aspect of
this analysis is that in a multiple country world, the uniqueness of worldwide
rational expectations equilibrium naturally depends jointly on the policies
adopted by the major players in the world economy. It may be possible
that one player is following a passive policy which, if followed by all coun-
tries worldwide, would lead to scope for endogenous volatility worldwide.
However, there may be ways in which a second policymaker can mitigate
the threat multiple equilibria posed by the ﬁrst policymaker. This logic sug-
gests a novel sense in which international policy coordination may be critical:
only through coordination can the uniqueness of worldwide equilibrium be
assured.
We conclude that considerations about the uniqueness and learnability of
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1.1 Overview
New Keynesian macroeconomic models have become a workhorse for studying
a variety of monetary policy issues in closed economy environments. An
important component of this eﬀort has been the development of the idea that
equilibrium determinacy and learnability may be signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by
monetary policy choices.1 Recently, simple extensions of the New Keynesian
model to open economy environments have been developed. Our primary
concern in this paper is to provide an analysis of the extent to which the
ﬁndings concerning determinacy and learnability for the closed economy New
Keynesian framework may be altered when open economy considerations are
brought to bear. Our learnability criterion is that of Evans and Honkapohja
(2001).
Our approach to this question is to adopt a simple framework for a two-
country world due to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). This framework
provides one straightforward extension of the New Keynesian model to two
countries and allows comparison to the more common single country and
small open economy analyses as special cases. The model has a natural
separation between countries that Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) discuss
in some detail. Roughly, after making certain adjustments to parameters
accounting for the degree of openness of each economy, this version of the
open economy New Keynesian model is qualitatively the same as the stan-
dard, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999)-style closed economy New Keynesian
model. We exploit this feature extensively in this paper. We show that the
n a t u r eo fm o n e t a r yp o l i c yi ne a c hc o u n t r yc a nl e a dt om o r eo rl e s si n t e r n a -
tional feedback, and complicate or simplify the conditions for determinacy
and learnability of worldwide equilibrium.
1See, for instance, Woodford (2003), Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans and Honkapohja
(2003a,b), and Preston (2003).
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We are able to make some progress analytically in showing how determinacy
and learnability conditions depend on the nature of monetary policy in each
country, the conditions under which one policymaker can or cannot mitigate
the threats of indeterminacy and expectational instability posed by another
country, and the degree to which international policy coordination may fail or
succeed in delivering determinacy and learnability of worldwide equilibrium.
The main ﬁndings are as follows. Instrument rules which are focussed on
domestic inﬂation and domestic output gaps lead to world determinacy and
learnability conditions which must be met in each economy independently of
whether they are met in the partner economy. Policymakers in even a large
economy cannot take actions which will mitigate the threats of indeterminacy
and expectational instability stemming from poor policy choices made by the
partner.
For targeting rules, this result has a natural counterpart when policymak-
ers in each country pursue non-cooperative optimal policy under discretion.
The choice of how to implement the optimality condition stemming from
the minimization problem faced by the monetary authorities can easily be
made inappropriately, leading to indeterminacy and expectational instability.
But the objectives of the two monetary authorities in this case involve only
domestic variables and so under the most natural implementation strategies
determinacy and learnability will again hinge on certain conditions being met
in each economy independently of the conditions for the partner economy.
On the other hand, instrument rules which include responses to inter-
national economic conditions induce international feedback between the two
economies even when there would otherwise be no such feedback. Policy
choices in each economy will then inﬂuence all aspects of the conditions for
determinacy and learnability of worldwide equilibrium. The separability of
conditions between countries breaks down. Policymakers in a large country
would then have some potential to render worldwide equilibrium determinate
and learnable even if not all players worldwide are pursuing policies which
meet minimal conditions for determinacy and learnability when viewed in
8
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isolation.This second result again has a natural counterpart in the case of targeting
rules, in the situation where the two countries agree to try to pursue the
gains from cooperation which may exist in the model. In this case, the joint
objective of the policymakers will involve weighted averages of inﬂation and
output gaps in the two economies. Implementation strategy will again be an
issue. Determinacy and learnability conditions will hinge on the nature of
the joint policy of the two central banks, and one policy authority may be
able to choose policy to deliver worldwide determinacy and learnability even
if the partner authority adopts a policy which would be inconsistent with
those objectives viewed in isolation.
We conclude that determinacy and learnability considerations can alter
the evaluation of monetary policy options in an international context.
1.3 Recent related literature
The seminal work on the New Keynesian framework and the role of mone-
tary policy is Woodford (2003). We have chosen to follow the extension to a
two-country environment proposed by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). We
stress that alternative extensions may produce substantively diﬀerent ﬁnd-
ings concerning determinacy and learnability than the ones we report here,
and for this reason we think it would be interesting to carry out the analysis
below in other environments. Still, we think that Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2002) provides a natural starting point.
Batini, Levine, and Pearlman (2004) study indeterminacy in a two-country
New Keynesian model. Their focus is on the relationship between many-
period forward-looking inﬂation forecast rules and indeterminacy conditions.
We do not consider rules in this class in this paper. When forward-looking
rules are considered here, they arise from the implementation of certain opti-
mality considerations and do not involve forecasts more than one period into
the future.
De Fiore and Liu (forthcoming) study indeterminacy in a small open
New Keynesian economy. Their model is somewhat diﬀerent from the one
9
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minacy will depend on the degree of openness in the small economy, a result
we also obtain.
Bencivenga, Huybens, and Smith (2001) study the relationship between
dollarization and the scope for endogenous volatility (that is, indeterminacy
implying the existence of sunspot equilibria). Their model emphasizes as-
pects of ﬁnancial intermediation which are not part of the analysis here. They
suggest that the degree of capital market integration plays an important role
in judging whether certain policy options are consistent with determinacy
or not. This type of capital market integration issue cannot be eﬀectively
addressed in the class of models we examine in this paper.
A number of papers study classic open economy issues in the New Keyne-
sian framework. Pappa (2004) and Benigno and Benigno (2004), for example,
study the gains from monetary policy coordination. Corsetti and Pesenti
(2005) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) analyze ‘self-oriented’ or ‘inward-
looking’ national monetary policies in frameworks related to the one studied
here. While touching on some related themes, these papers do not focus on
the determinacy and learnability issues we emphasize.
Ellison, Sarno, and Vilmunen (2004) study central bank learning in the
two-country world of Aghion, Becchetta, and Banerjee (2001). They al-
low fundamental parameters in the economy to follow Markov switching
processes, and central banks update their inference concerning the current
regime via Bayes rule. This optimal ﬁltering conception of learning is quite
interesting and, as the authors show, can have important implications for
policy. But it is also conceptually distinct from the expectational stability
analysis of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), in which small expectational errors
may propagate and drive the economy away from the targeted equilibrium
desired by policymakers. The present paper has both private sector and
central bank learning in some circumstances where the central banks’ imple-
mentation of policy involves a policy rule with forward-looking components.2
2For an analysis of how uncertainty about model parameters may drive central bank
learning and alter our assessment of what would otherwise be optimal policy under full
10
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omy case for a model due to Uribe (2003) which is again somewhat diﬀerent
f r o mt h eo n ew es t u d y . W ec o m m e n to nt h ep u r c h a s i n gp o w e rp a r i t yr u l e s
of Zanna and relate them to our ﬁndings later in the paper. Zanna (2004)
contains results on learnable sunspot equilibria under common factor repre-
sentations, a topic we have not addressed here.
Working in parallel with us, Llosa and Tuesta (2005) study determinacy
and learnability in a version of the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) model
we use. Whereas we emphasize the two country model they analyze the
model from the point of view of the small open economy. Llosa and Tuesta
(2005) study instrument rules more extensively than we do, including diﬀer-
ent forms of Taylor-type rules as in Bullard and Mitra (2002). We discuss
both instrument and targeting rules. The Llosa and Tuesta (2005) discussion
of domestic inﬂation versus consumer price index inﬂa t i o ni nt h ep o l i c yr u l e
parallels some of our analysis, and we compare our results to theirs when
appropriate.
1.4 Organization
We begin by presenting the basic model environment in the next section. We
take up our analysis of the eﬀects of policy on determinacy and learnability by
ﬁrst considering instrument rules, simple descriptions of policy that allow us
to develop some basic results and intuition, especially concerning “country
by country” determinacy and learnability conditions. Policymakers using
rules in this class might break the natural separability of country analysis
in the model should they decide to react in part to international variables
when setting monetary policy, and we develop a version of this situation in
some detail. We end this section by providing a brief discussion of purchasing
power parity instrument rules.
We then turn to targeting rules, whereby the policy rule is inferred from
an optimization exercise undertaken by each monetary authority. The na-
information, see Aoki and Nikolov (2004). They study the closed economy case.
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cooperative assumptions will preserve the natural separability of country
analysis in the model and thus keep determinacy and learnability assess-
ments unique to each country, while cooperative assumptions will not. The
ﬁnal portion of the paper takes up certain asymmetric situations which do
not ﬁtn e a t l yi n t ot h ea b o v ec a t e g o r i e s . O n eo ft h e s ei st h ec a s eo fo n e
country pegging its exchange rate to a second country which is following
an independent monetary policy. We discuss our ﬁndings and directions for
future research in the conclusion.
2 A two-country New Keynesian model
2.1 Overview
We employ the two-country model of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). This
is one natural extension of the closed economy New Keynesian model to the
open economy case in which two large economies are interacting, and so it
provides a good starting point for the analysis of determinacy issues in the
open economy. Our purpose is not to develop new aspects of this model per
se, but to use the model to try to understand some of the main considera-
tions that might arise concerning determinacy and learnability in the world
economy, when determinacy and learnability can be importantly inﬂuenced
by policymakers. Accordingly, we merely present the main equations of the
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) framework here. Interested readers are
referred to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) for details.
2.2 Environment
The model economy is log-linearized about a steady state and is given by
˜ yt = Et˜ yt+1 − σ
−1
o [rt − Etπt+1 − rrt], (1)
πt = βEtπt+1 + λo˜ yt + ut (2)
12
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[(1 − θ)(1− βθ)]/θ. The variable ˜ yt represents the domestic output gap, πt
represents the deviation of domestic producer price inﬂation from a target
value set by the domestic monetary authority, and rt represents the devia-
tion of the short term nominal interest rate from the value consistent with
domestic inﬂation at target and a zero domestic output gap. Here rrt is the
domestic natural real interest rate (conditional on foreign output), given by
rrt = σoEt∆¯ yt+1 + κoEt∆y
 
t+1,
where ∆¯ yt+1 is the rate of growth of the domestic natural level of output
and ∆y 
t+1 is the rate of growth of the level of foreign output. The stochastic
term ut follows an AR(1) process given by
ut = ρut−1 +  t,
with 0 ≤ ρ<1, where  u,t is an iid stochastic term. The symbol Et is the
standard expectations operator. The equations (1) and (2) have ﬁve funda-
mental parameters: The household discount factor β,a parameter controlling
the curvature in preferences over consumption σ, a parameter controlling the
curvature in preferences over leisure φ, the mass of agents or degree of open-
ness γ, and the probability that a ﬁr mw i l ln o tb ea b l et oc h a n g ei t sp r i c e
today θ, which we sometimes refer to as the degree of price stickiness. The
foreign economy is described analogously as
˜ y
 



























o =( 1− γ)(σ − 1),σ  
o = σ − κ 
o,κ   = σ − κ 
o + φ, λ
 
o = δκ , and
δ =[ ( 1− θ)(1− βθ)]/θ. In these equations ˜ y 
t is the foreign output gap, π 
t
is the deviation of foreign producer price inﬂation from a target value set by
the government, and r 
t is the deviation of the foreign nominal interest rate
from a value consistent with inﬂation at target and output at potential. The
13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 611
April 2006term rr 











where ∆¯ y 
t+1 is the rate of growth of the foreign natural level of output and
∆yt+1 is the rate of growth of the level of domestic output. The stochastic
term u 





t−1 +  
 
u,t
with 0 ≤ ρ<1, where   
u,t is an iid stochastic term. In equations (3) and (4),
the fundamental parameters β, σ, φ, γ, and θ a r ea l lt h es a m ea si ne q u a t i o n s
(1) and (2), reﬂecting a maintained assumption that the preferences and
technologies in the two economies are the same. The only diﬀerence is that
γ in (1) and (2) has been replaced by 1 − γ in (3) and (4).
The domestic and foreign natural rates of interest, rrt and rr 
t, in part
reﬂect expected changes in potential output in the foreign and the domes-
tic economies. In order to remain consistent with the closed economy New
Keynesian literature, such as Woodford (1999), in this section we will view
the natural rates of interest as exogenous stochastic terms following AR(1)
processes, again with serial correlation 0 ≤ ρ<1, and iid disturbances  rr,t
and   
rr,t, respectively. Later in the paper we will use the Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2002) formulation in which these terms are observed directly by the
economy’s participants.
The nominal exchange rate et obeys consumer price index-based, or “ag-
gregate” purchasing power parity, and is given by
et =( pC,t − p
 
C,t)
=( pt + γst) − (p
 
t − {(1 − γ)st})
= pt − p
 
t + st
where pt is shorthand for the domestic producer price level pH,t, p 
t is short-
hand for the foreign producer price level p 
F,t,a n dw h e r epC,t and p 
C,t represent
the home and foreign consumer price index, respectively. Finally, a simple
14
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st =( ˜ yt − ˜ y
 
t)+(¯ yt − ¯ y
 
t)
=( ˜ yt − ˜ y
 
t)+¯ st
where ¯ st is the natural level of the terms of trade.
The open economy eﬀects in this model come through the composite
parameters κo and κ 
o. In the special case where σ =1 , the eﬀects vanish
as κo = κ 
o =0 . In this special case, each economy evolves as if it were an
isolated, closed economy. In addition, the special cases where either γ → 0
or γ → 1 respectively place all the mass of agents in the home or the foreign
economy. In these cases, the home or foreign economy behaves as if it were
an isolated, closed economy, while the partner behaves as if it were a small
open economy.3
The two-country model involves the short-term nominal interest rates rt
and r 
t. In the remainder of the paper we will analyze the model under dif-
ferent scenarios for how these interest rates are determined by policymakers.
We will begin with a simple speciﬁcation that produces simple intuition, and
later move to more complicated optimal policy speciﬁcations under a variety
of assumptions on the nature of the optimization policymakers undertake.
3 Instrument rules
3.1 Simple Taylor-type rules
3.1.1 The dynamic system
In this section we simply assume that the policymakers in each country follow
Taylor-type policy rules given by
rt = ϕππt + ϕy˜ yt (5)
3Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) and Gali and Monacelli (2002) analyze the case of a
small open economy using a similar framework.
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for the foreign economy. By substituting (5) and (6) into equations (1)
and (3), we can write the four equation system as follows. First, deﬁne
Zt =[ ˜ yt,πt, ˜ y 
t,π 
t]
0 along with Vt =[ rrt,u t,rr 
t,u  
t]
0 . Then write the system
as
Zt = A0 + BEtZt+1 + XVt (7)









σo + ϕy + λoϕπ
∙
σo 1 − βϕπ





















































and where Vt follows a vector AR(1) process with serial correlation given by
the scalar ρ.
4We stay consistent with Bullard and Mitra (2002) in allowing for constant terms.
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Because the four variables in this system are free in the terminology of Blan-
chard and Kahn (1980), we require all eigenvalues of B to be inside the unit
circle for determinacy. Since B is block diagonal, this requirement means
that the eigenvalues of B11 and B22 must be inside the unit circle. From a
version of Proposition 1 in Bullard and Mitra (2002), this implies that the
following two conditions must hold for determinacy in this system:






π − 1) + (1 − β)ϕ
 
y > 0. (9)
These conditions are versions of the Taylor principle for each country and
depend on the household discount factor β, which is assumed to be the same
in the two countries, on the policy parameters in the Taylor-type rules in the
two countries, and on the composite parameters λo and λ
 
o. We can write the
composite parameters as
λo = δ[σ + φ − γ (σ − 1)],
λ
 
o = δ[σ + φ − (1 − γ)(σ − 1)].
Thus the conditions (8) and (9) can be written as
δ[σ + φ − γ (σ − 1)](ϕπ − 1) + (1 − β)ϕy > 0 (10)
and
δ[σ + φ − (1 − γ)(σ − 1)](ϕ
 
π − 1) + (1 − β)ϕ
 
y > 0. (11)
The term in brackets is positive, so that if ϕy = ϕ 
y =0 , the conditions state
that each central bank has to move nominal interest rates more than one-
for-one in response to deviations of inﬂation from target. We have several
r e m a r k so nc o n d i t i o n s( 1 0 )a n d( 1 1 ) .
First, the conditions are not the same except in the special case where
policies are identical (in the sense that ϕπ = ϕ 
π and ϕy = ϕ 
y)a n dγ =1 /2,
17
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open.5 Otherwise, the degree of openness diﬀers and this translates into
ad i ﬀerence in the two conditions. This means in particular that identical
policy in the two countries, in the sense of identical values for the Taylor-type
policy rule coeﬃcients, may be enough to meet one determinacy condition
but not the other.
Second, the policy parameters from a single country can only inﬂuence one
of the two conditions. Thus policymakers from each country must separately
meet conditions for determinacy: Determinacy conditions are met, in some
sense, “country by country.”6 If one country fails, then worldwide equilibrium
is indeterminate, and one country cannot “make up for” the failure of a
second country to meet appropriate conditions.
3.1.3 Learnability
We now turn to the learnability of rational expectations equilibrium for cases
where that equilibrium is unique. We allow the expectations in equation (7)
to initially be diﬀerent from rational expectations.7 The MSV solution of
equation (7) is given by
Zt = ¯ A + ¯ CVt
where the conformable matrix ¯ A is null and
¯ C =( I − ρB)
−1 X.
5If γ = 1
2, there is no home bias in consumption. More generally, for γ<1
2,b o t h
country H and country F consumers will demand relatively more H goods than F goods,
while for γ>1
2, both sets of consumers will demand relatively more F goods than H
goods. Likewise, 1 − γ corresponds to the share of country F consumption allocated to
goods imported from country H, and so is a measure of openness for that country. This
has the important implication that as γ increases country H becomes more open and F
moves towards more autarky (1 − γ declines).
6This is due to the combination of ﬂexible exchange rates and purchasing power partity
which keeps countries perfectly insulated from foreign instabilities transmitted via the
terms of trade. With a ﬁxed exchange rate this will no longer be the case.
7Preston (2003) considers deriving the fundamental equations of models in this class
assuming agents are learning. Under his interpretation of the microfoundations, the equa-
tions are altered and long-horizon forecasts matter. We think it would be interesting to
carry out an analysis of this type for the open economy case.
18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 611
April 2006We endow agents with a perceived law of motion
Zt = A + CVt (12)
where A and C are conformable. Using this perceived law of motion and
assuming time t information (1,rrt,u t,rr 
t,u  
t)
0 we can calculate
EtZt+1 = A + CρVt.
Substituting this into equation (7) yields the actual law of motion
Zt = B(A + CρVt)+XVt
= BA+( BCρ + X)Vt.
We then deﬁne a map T from the perceived law of motion to the actual law
of motion as
T (A,C)=( BA,BCρ + X).
Expectational stability is attained if the diﬀerential equation
d
dτ
(A,C)=T (A,C) − (A,C)
is locally asymptotically stable at
¡ ¯ A, ¯ C
¢
. Results in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) establish that under weak conditions, expectational stability governs
stability in the real-time learning dynamics.
We use Proposition 10.3 in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) to calculate
the condition for expectational stability. According to the proposition, the
condition for expectational stability is that the real parts of the eigenvalues of
the matrices B and ρB are less than unity. Because 0 ≤ ρ<1, this means that
the we need only check the real parts of the eigenvalues of B. Also, because
of the block diagonality of B, the expectational stability condition can be
calculated country by country, that is, via B11 and B22, and by a version of
Proposition 2 in Bullard and Mitra (2002) yields conditions (10) and (11).
This means that both countries must meet the open economy version of the
Taylor principle in order for the world equilibrium to be learnable. It also
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learnability in the special case where both countries follow simple Taylor-type
instrument rules. This is known not to be true in general in models in this
class with alternative instrument rules, but it provides a good benchmark.8
In this calculation we have proceeded as if all actors in the world economy
possessed the entire information set (1,rrt,u t,rr 
t,u  
t)
0 . This is a natural as-
sumption in a domestic economy setting, but it may not be as natural in a
multi-country setting. It means that all actors in all countries are keeping
track of all state variables worldwide. Instead, one might assume that domes-
tic residents have the information set (1,rrt,u t)
0 and that foreign residents
have the information set (1,rr 
t,u  
t)
0 . One would then postulate perceived
laws of motion for each set of agents as
Z11,t = A11 + C11V11,t,
Z22,t = A22 + C22V22,t,
where Z11 =[ ˜ yt,πt]
0 ,Z 22 =[ ˜ y 
t,π 
t]
0 ,V 11 =[ rrt,u t]




and where A11,A 22,C 11, and C22 are conformable matrices. Because of the
block diagonality in the system, proceeding in this way will yield the same
conditions for expectational stability. However, this may not be the case for
other systems, as we discuss below.
3.1.4 Quantitative eﬀects
As stressed by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001, 2002), the nature of the
policy problem faced by each country in this open economy framework is iso-
morphic to the closed economy case, but there are nevertheless quantitative
consequences. Figure 1 illustrates. Here the calibration has been chosen so
that the domestic economy collapses to the one studied by Woodford (1999)
when the openness parameter γ → 0. W o o d f o r d ’ s( 1 9 9 9 )v a l u e sh a v eb e e n
8An example of a case in which determinacy and learnability conditions do not coincide
is when the policy authorities use a Taylor-type policy rule but react to lagged information
on inﬂation and the output gap. See Bullard and Mitra (2002). For a wider variety of
Taylor-type instrument rules in a similar model, see Llosa and Tuesta (2005).
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April 2006Figure 1: The conditions for determinacy and learnability when each mon-
etary authority uses a simple contemporaneous data Taylor rule. The more
open economy will have a steeper tradeoﬀ in the Figure.
widely used and provide a simple benchmark. The discount factor β =0 .99.
When γ → 0,σ o → σ and we set this to Woodford’s value of σ =0 .157. The
coeﬃcient λo would correspond to a value of λo =0 .024 in the Woodford
calibration. When γ → 0,κ o → 0 so that κ → σ + φ, and λo = δ(σ + φ),
with δ =[ ( 1− θ)(1− βθ)]/θ. We follow Woodford (2003) and set φ to the
nearly linear value 0.11. Given other parameters, this means that θ =0 .745
to obtain λo =0 .024.
The ﬁgure plots (10) as a function of ϕπ and ϕy using this calibration for
values of γ between zero and unity. Since (11) is the same condition for the
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1 as representing this condition as well. The line labelled γ =0represents
the case when the home country is closed and corresponds to the condition
from Bullard and Mitra (2002, their Figure 1). The determinacy and learn-
ability condition for the foreign country would then correspond to the line
labelled γ =1(that is, 1 − γ would equal one if γ =0 ).9 Thus the small
open foreign economy would have to choose its Taylor rule coeﬃcients to
the northeast of this line in the ﬁgure, while the large closed home econ-
omy would only have to choose its Taylor rule coeﬃcients to the northeast
of the line labelled γ =0 . Failure of either country to abide by its condi-
tion would produce indeterminacy and the possibility of sunspot ﬂuctuations
in the world equilibrium. These lines are closer together if the degree of
openness γ is intermediate between zero and one, as illustrated by the lines
labelled γ =1 /3 and γ =2 /3. For γ =1 /2, the conditions for determinacy
and learnability in the two countries would be identical.
One of the main implications of Figure 1 is that the open economy lines
with γ greater than zero all lie above the closed economy line, so that con-
ditions for determinacy and learnability become more stringent when open
economy considerations are introduced. A central bank analyzing its econ-
omy as if it were closed might mistakenly chose Taylor rule coeﬃcients that
are too small to deliver determinacy and learnability of equilibrium.
Another stark implication of this simple Taylor rule case is that the de-
terminacy and learnability conditions must be met country by country. The
coeﬃcients in the Taylor-type rule chosen by policymakers in one country
do not inﬂuence the conditions that apply to the partner economy. If the
policymakers in the foreign economy chose values which are inappropriate,
then domestic policymakers, even if they are very aggressive, cannot alter
this facet of world equilibrium. This complete dichotomy can easily break
down however, and we shall now turn to a simple case where this occurs.
9Llosa and Tuesta (2005) focus on the small open economy and depict the same line in
their Figure 1 for their domestic inﬂation rule, which would correspond to this case. Their
model is similar to the one used here and has a similar calibration.
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3.2.1 Consumer versus producer price inﬂation
In this section we illustrate how these results are altered when each country
pays attention to an international variable in its policy rule. We do this
by positing simple variants on the ad hoc rule of the previous section. In
this case, the block diagonality property of the system can be lost. In some
c a s e s ,o n ec o u n t r yc a nt a k eap o l i c ys t a n c et h a tw i l lm i t i g a t et h et h r e a t s
of indeterminacy and expectational instability caused by another country’s
poor policy. The purpose of this section is to establish this fact in a simple
environment.
We begin by supposing that each country pursues a Taylor-type rule fea-
turing consumer price index, or CPI, inﬂation instead of domestic producer
price inﬂation.10 This is intuitively plausible as in an open economy CPI in-
ﬂation, not domestic producer price inﬂation, is often the variable of interest
for the monetary authority. We show that targeting CPI inﬂation is equiv-
alent to having a conventional Taylor-type rule augmented by a third term
which is the terms of trade. The monetary policy rule in the home country
is given by
rt = ϕππC,t + ϕy˜ yt, (13)













πC,t = πt + γst (15)





t − (1 − γ)st (16)
is foreign CPI inﬂation. The inﬂation targets of the monetary authorities
implicit in these speciﬁcations would then be in terms of CPI inﬂation. Using
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policymakers eﬀectively respond to both their domestic inﬂation rates and
to the terms of trade














where ϕs = ϕπγ and ϕ 
s = ϕ 
π(1 − γ).
From (17) and (18) it can be seen that the home (foreign) central bank
raises (lowers) interest rates when the terms of trade st = pF,t−pH,t = p 
t −pt
increases, that is, deteriorates from the perspective of the home country. This
is because a worsening of the terms of trade–a higher st–raises (lowers) the
home (foreign) CPI inﬂation rate. The eﬀect on domestic (foreign) interest
rates is higher the more open the economy, that is, the larger (smaller) the
parameter γ. In the special case where the home (foreign) economy is closed,
CPI and domestic inﬂation are equivalent and the domestic (foreign) central
bank simply responds to domestic (foreign) inﬂation.
Rules (17) and (18) can be further simpliﬁed by taking into account that
in equilibrium the terms of trade (in logs) depends on the diﬀerence between
the home and foreign output levels, or
st = yt − y
 
t =˜ yt − ˜ y
 
t +¯ st,
where ¯ st i st h el e v e lo ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ho u t p u ta tp o -
tential in each economy, the natural level of the terms of trade. Substituting
into (17) and (18) yields
rt = ϕππt +[ ϕy + ϕs]˜ yt − ϕs˜ y
 















s˜ yt − ϕ
 
s¯ st. (20)
Now both central banks can be viewed as responding not only to domestic
economic events, but also to foreign conditions in the form of foreign output
gaps. In addition, they now respond more aggressively to domestic output
gaps as is evident from the higher coeﬃcients, ϕy+ϕs >ϕ y and ϕ 
y+ϕ 
s >ϕ  
y,
than one ﬁnds in the simple Taylor rule of the previous section. The reason
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t)
ceteris paribus implies a more favorable terms of trade, which lowers home
CPI inﬂation and thus allows the home central bank to lower interest rates.
The opposite is true for a higher home output gap, hence the higher response
coeﬃcient on ˜ yt. Similarly, from the perspective of the foreign country a
higher home output gap (higher ˜ yt) gives rise to a more favorable terms of
trade, which lowers the foreign CPI and thereby makes room for interest rate
cuts abroad. The opposite is true for a higher foreign output gap, hence the
higher response coeﬃcient on ˜ y 
t.
3.2.2 The dynamic system
Substituting (19) and (20) into (1) and (3) yields a dynamic system in the
same form as equation (7). We will use the fact that ϕs = γϕπ and ϕ 
s =
(1 − γ)ϕ 
π to facilitate comparison with the ﬁndings of the previous section.
The system can be written as
Zt = A0 + BEtZt+1 + XVt, (21)
where we have included the terms involving ¯ st in the vector
Vt =[ rrt − γϕπ¯ st,u t,rr
 






The terms in this vector are again assumed to follow independent AR(1)
processes with serial correlation coeﬃcient ρ and iid disturbances. The terms
Z, A0,a n dX are deﬁn e da si ne q u a t i o n( 7 ) ,b u tt h ek e ym a t r i xB is no longer
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1 σ ,−1































[γ + λo]ϕπ + ϕy
¢ª.
The main diﬀerence is that B12 and B21 are no longer null. We stress that
the loss of the block diagonality of this matrix is induced by policy alone.
Policymakers are reacting to consumer rather than producer prices and this
is creating international linkages that would otherwise not exist. This means,
in principle, that policy parameters in one country will inﬂuence all aspects11
of worldwide conditions for determinacy and learnability. The separability
of these conditions across borders breaks down because the policymakers are
reacting to variables that have foreign components.
11That is, all four eigenvalues.
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One economy is large Determinacy again requires that all eigenvalues
of B are inside the unit circle. We begin with the special case in which the
home country is closed so that γ → 0. From equation (17) it is as if the home
country is using the simple Taylor rule analyzed in the previous section. In
this case B12 becomes null, B11 is the submatrix associated with the simple
Taylor rule, B21 does not become null, and B22 is altered from the simple
Taylor rule case. The eigenvalues of B are then the eigenvalues of (1/b0)B11
and (1/b0)B22 since B is lower block triangular. The opposite pattern occurs
if the foreign country is very large so that (1 − γ) → 0.
The eigenvalues of (1/b0)B11 will be inside the unit circle if the condition
δ[σ + φ](ϕπ − 1) + (1 − β)ϕy > 0
is met, that is, the closed economy condition for a simple Taylor rule. For






















o + ϕ 





This is the same matrix that would apply in the simple Taylor rule economy
e x c e p tt h a ta ne x t r at e r mϕ 
π enters in the denominator of the factor multi-
plying the matrix, and an extra term βϕ 
π enters the lower right position in






















o + ϕ 










The conditions for both eigenvalues to be inside the unit circle are that
|a0| < 1 and |a1| < 1+a0. The ﬁrst condition is always met under maintained
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Large closed domestic economy
Small open foreign economy
Figure 2
Instrument rules with CPI inflation
Small open economy case
Indeterminacy
Determinacy
Figure 2: The small open economy faces a much steeper tradeoﬀ between ϕ 
y
and ϕ 
π when both countries react to CPI inﬂation.





π − 1) + (1 − β)ϕ
 
π +( 1− β)ϕ
 
y > 0. (22)
This diﬀers from the Taylor rule case by the term (1 − β)ϕ 
π. We have several
remarks on condition (22).
First, condition (22) depends only on foreign economy parameters. Thus,
this condition must be met by the foreign authorities independently of the
policy rule parameters adopted domestically.12 The condition essentially still
represents the Taylor principle. In particular, for a value of ϕ 
y =0 , the
12We stress that we have achieved this dichotomy only by assuming γ → 0 here, whereas
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π >β≈ 1 to meet the determi-
nacy condition. The main quantitative eﬀect of condition (22) is to greatly
steepen the tradeoﬀ between values of ϕ 
y and ϕ 
π that are consistent with de-
terminacy. The ϕ 
y-intercept increases to λ
 
o (1 − β)
−1 ≈ 100 at the baseline
calibration. These facts are illustrated in Figure 2.
Both economies have positive mass When 0 <γ<1 the analysis
of the previous subsection no longer holds. Instead, the policy parameters
from both countries will enter into consideration for all four eigenvalues of
t h es y s t e m . O n ew a yt og e ts o m ei d e ao ft h i st r a d e o ﬀ is to consider the
special case where the two countries do not respond directly to output gaps
in their policy rules. This means that the values ϕy = ϕ 
y =0 , and that
the two central banks only respond to consumer price index inﬂa t i o ni ne a c h
country. We set γ =1 /3 for the purposes of this calculation, meaning that the
home economy is larger and less open, and we set the remaining parameters
at their baseline values, other than the two remaining policy parameters ϕπ
and ϕ 
π.
The analysis of learnability of determinate equilibria in this case follows
Section 3.1.3. As in that discussion, the expectational stability condition will
be that real parts of the eigenvalues of the matrix B are less than unity.13
Quantitatively, the conditions for determinacy and learnability coincide again
in this case. Although the system has been altered relative to the system
with the simple Taylor rule, each monetary authority is still reacting to
contemporaneous information in its policy rule, and this is keeping the two
conditions consistent.14
Figure 3 shows how the values of these two parameters can trade oﬀ
against one another in order to generate determinacy and learnability of
the world equilibrium. The larger home country needs to have the larger
13The question of learnability of sunspot equilibria is more complicated and is left to
future work.
14Learnability would fail if the agents were only allowed to use information from their
own countries. Agents would be given a perceived law of motion that would not include
foreign variables, and this would be insuﬃcient to learn the REE.
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Home country larger, no output response
Figure 3: The region consistent with determinacy and learnability involves a
trade-oﬀ between the policy responses, ϕπ and ϕ 
π, in the two economies. The
output responses have been set to zero. The blank region is associated with
indeterminacy. The home country has the larger, relatively closed economy.
coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the policy rule, while the foreign policy authorities
can choose something less than unity. If foreign policymakers choose a low
value of ϕ 
π, the home policymakers may be able to react more aggressively
to inﬂation and therefore generate a determinate world equilibrium.
International sunspot transmission Is it possible for poor monetary
policy in one country to create worldwide endogenous ﬂuctuations in the
form of sunspot equilibria? Figure 2 suggests that the answer is yes and
in this subsection we provide a simple example. Here we follow Woodford’s
(1999) discussion of sunspot equilibria in the domestic economy case. We
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y =0 , with remaining parameters other
than ϕπ and ϕ 
π set to baseline values. We then suppose that the monetary
authorities in the home country adopt a policy of ϕπ =1 .2 while the foreign
policy authorities adopt a policy of ϕ 
π =0 .25. Figure 2 suggests that this
combination is insuﬃcient to generate determinacy worldwide. In some sense
the problem is the foreign policymakers since ϕ 
π =0 .25 is “too low.”





Three of the eigenvalues of B−1 are outside the unit circle, but one is inside
indicating indeterminacy for this system written in terms of B−1.T h i se i g e n -
value is v ≈ 0.94 and the associated eigenvector is bv ≈ [0.46,0.35,−0.02,0.82]0.
If {Zt} satisﬁes (23), then another bounded solution is given by
Z
0
t = Zt + bvζt
where
ζt+1 = vζt + ηt+1.
The stochastic term ηt+1 can be any mean zero bounded random variable
unforecastable at time t. The stochastic process ηt+1 can have any correla-
tion with the fundamental disturbances in the two economies, and can be
highly variable so long as the linear approximations on which (23) is based
remain valid. Therefore, as stressed by Woodford (1999) for the closed econ-
omy, the ﬂuctuations induced in [˜ yt,πt, ˜ y 
t,π 
t]
0 can be large in magnitude
and therefore some of the equilibrium sequences would be quite bad from a
welfare perspective. Furthermore, although we do not stress it in this paper,
recent research has isolated conditions under which sunspot equilibria can be
learnable in the sense deﬁned by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). An example
related to the current context is provided by Zanna (2004). We conclude
t h a tt h e r ei sc o n s i d e r a b l ep o l i c yr i s ki nt h ei n d e t e r m i n a t er e g i o n .
The potential for expectations to ﬂuctuate considerably in excess of fun-
damentals and yet remain consistent with rational expectations equilibrium
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ing among policies that induce a unique rational expectations equilibrium,
policymakers are comparing outcomes with at most the volatility induced
by the fundamental driving stochastic processes of the system. But policies
that allow indeterminacy can be associated with equilibrium outcomes with
a volatility many times that of the fundamental shocks. The welfare gain in
avoiding the high volatility outcomes associated with indeterminacy is ﬁrst
order, while the welfare gain in choosing among alternative policies all of
which induce determinacy is second- or even third-order.15
3.3 Two PPP instrument rules
Zanna (2004, p. 2) points out that the real exchange rate is perhaps the
most popular real target in developing economies. Policymakers are often
concerned about avoiding losses in competitiveness in foreign markets, or
similarly, about maintaining purchasing power parity (PPP). According to
Zanna, in order to achieve the real exchange rate target policymakers often
follow PPP rules. Such rules link the nominal rate of devaluation of the
domestic currency to the deviation of the real exchange rate from its long
run level or to the diﬀerence between the domestic inﬂation rate and the
foreign inﬂation rate. For instance, Calvo, et al. (1995) argued that Brazil,
C h i l ea n dC o l u m b i af o l l o w e ds u c hr u l e si nt h ep a s t . 16
An important contribution to the theoretical literature on this topic is
Uribe (2003), who analyzes a PPP rule whereby the government increases the
devaluation rate when the real exchange rate is below its steady-state value.
Uribe (2003) argues that PPP rules may lead to indeterminacy, potentially
inducing aggregate instability in the economy via endogenous ﬂuctuations
due to self-fulﬁlling expectations.
15This latter argument has recently been reiterated by Lucas (2003).
16Calvo, et al. (1995) mention that starting in 1968, Brazil’s government implemented
a rule by which the exchange rate was adjusted as a function of the diﬀerence between
domestic and U.S. inﬂation. In addition, between 1985 and 1992, Chile used an exchange
rate band whose trend was determined by the diﬀerence between the domestic inﬂation
rate and a measure of the average inﬂation in the rest of the world.
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may be associated with indeterminacy in a small open economy with traded
and non-traded goods. Zanna (2004) ﬁnds that the lower the degree of open-
ness of the economy, the more likely it is that the rule will induce aggregate
instability in the economy by generating multiple equilibria. Further, he
studies the learnability properties of equilibria induced by PPP rules. He in-
vestigates both a Uribe and a Dornbusch (1982)-type rule–which we here call
the Zanna rule–whereby the nominal devaluation rate is positively linked to
the diﬀerence between the domestic and foreign CPI inﬂation rates.
In this section we investigate the properties of stylized Uribe (2003) and
Zanna (2004) instrument rules in our environment. We start with the former.
Suppose the home country follows a Uribe-type PPP rule whereby the home
central bank sets the nominal devaluation rate as a function of the deviation
of the (log of the) current CPI-based real exchange rate qt with respect to
its steady state level
_
q






C,t + et − pC,t (25)
and ρq < 0.17 The nominal exchange rate in our two country world is given
by the law of one price–that is, the (log) CPI-based real exchange rate is
z e r o ,s ot h a tw eh a v epC,t = p 
C,t +et,o rqt =0 . Using this result in the PPP
rule (24) and normalizing the initial (t − 1) level of the nominal exchange
r a t ea tz e r o ,t h eU r i b er u l er e d u c e st o
et =0 . (26)
Thus, in our environment we have the result that if the home country fol-
lows the Uribe PPP rule (24)–if it targets the real exchange rate–under
conditions where the nominal exchange rate already obeys PPP, the home
country eﬀectively pegs its nominal exchange rate to the foreign country.
17Using the notation of this paper Uribe assumes that ρq =
dρ
det < 0 where ρ(.) is a
continous function that in steady state satisﬁes ∆¯ et = ρ(0).
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w h e r e b yi tl i n k st h en o m i n a ld e p r e c i a t i o no ft h ee x c h a n g er a t et ot h ed i ﬀer-
ence between home CPI inﬂation, πC,t, and foreign CPI inﬂation π 
C,t,
∆et = ρπ(πC,t − π
 
C,t) (27)
where 0 <ρ π < 1.18 This speciﬁcation tries to capture the previously men-
tioned stylized facts about PPP rules in Brazil, Columbia and Chile.
The intuition behind this rule is that by increasing the nominal depre-
ciation rate in response to the international inﬂation diﬀerential the home
country stabilizes its real exchange rate. A g a i n ,w eh a v et od e a lw i t ht h e
phenomenon that the nominal exchange rate in our two country world is al-
ready given by the law of one price: the (log) CPI-based real exchange rate
is zero. That is, we have πC,t = π 
C,t + ∆et. Using this result in the Zanna
P P Pr u l e( 2 7 )w eh a v e(1−ρπ)∆et =0 , which after the usual normalization
implies (26).
Altogether, this section provides a simple general result for PPP rules,
namely that if the home country follows a PPP rule (that is, if it targets the
real exchange rate)–either in the form of the Zanna rule (27) or in the form
of the Uribe rule (24)–under conditions where the nominal exchange rate
already obeys PPP, the home country eﬀectively pegs its nominal exchange
rate to the foreign country. The learnability and determinacy properties
of the two PPP rules above are therefore identical to those of a system in
which one country follows a nominal exchange rate peg. This provides some
motivation for investigating the desirability of such an exchange rate regime.
We consider this situation in Section 5.1 below under targeting rules.
18In Zanna’s analysis foreign variables are considered exogenous and constant, therefore
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4.1 Overview
In this section we assume that the central bank sets policy optimally. This
means that the nominal interest rate is set according to a rule inferred from
an explicit optimization exercise.19 We investigate the benchmark case of
discretion20 and consider two implementation strategies of the ﬁrst-order
condition along the lines of Evans and Honkapohja (2003). The various
implementation strategies may or may not provide determinacy and learn-
ability of rational expectations equilibrium. In the next sub-section we focus
on the non-cooperative case in which each policymaker sets monetary policy
autonomously. We will turn to the cooperative case in Section 4.3.
4.2 Non-cooperative discretionary policy
4.2.1 The policy problem
Importantly, as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) mention, the correct inﬂa-
tion variable for the policymaker following a non-cooperative discretionary
policy is domestic producer price inﬂation. This means πt will enter into
the objective for the domestic policymaker. Under discretion the monetary
authority will choose a sequence of current and future short-term nominal
interest rates to minimize loss deﬁned by















δ and αo ≡ δκ
ξ = λo
ξ ,a n dw h e r eπT and ˜ yT are target values
which we will often view as being zero. The parameter ξ represents the price
19For a recent discussion about targeting versus instrument rules see Svensson (2003),
McCallum and Nelson (2004), as well as Svensson (2004).
20For a discussion of determinacy issues for optimal rules in a closed economy where the
timing protocol is commitment, see Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b).
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˜ yt = Et˜ yt+1 − σ
−1
o (rt − Etπt+1 − rrt), (29)
and
πt = βEtπt+1 + λo˜ yt + ut, (30)
where21




ut = ρut−1 +  t.
Optimal policy under discretion reduces to a sequence of static problems
in which the nominal interest rate is chosen to deliver the values ˜ yt and πt
which minimize the loss. We can reformulate the problem above as choosing
the indirect control variable {˜ yτ}
∞
τ=t to minimize (28) where the central bank
treats Etπt+1 as given.
This problem can be viewed as a Stackelberg game in which the private
sector (the leader) sets Etπt+1 and Et˜ yt+1 before the central bank determines
rt. This means that the private sector commits–the natural counterpart
to what the literature calls the ‘commitment case’ where it is the central
bank which commits. So, here we are looking at a Stackelberg equilibrium
where the private sector is the dominant player. This would be the case
where the private sector can ‘commit’ to inﬂation and output forecasts before
the central bank’s optimal level of the short term nominal interest rate is
set. In this environment, two conditions deﬁne the equilibrium: (i)F o ra n y
private sector forecast, the central bank’s policy response is optimal given
that forecast, and (ii) Given the reaction function of the central bank as
deﬁn e di n( i), the private sector forecast is optimal.
The equilibrium can be computed by working backwards. First, we com-
pute the optimal level of the nominal interest rate given private sector output
21In this section we follow Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and we do not specify a
stochastic process for rrt.
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˜ yτ − ˜ y
T¢2 − β
τ−tµτ (πτ − βEτπτ+1 − λo˜ yτ − uτ)
i
where πt and Etπt+1 are state variables. The ﬁrst order conditions are
∂L
∂˜ yt
= −αoΛ(1 − γ)
¡
˜ yt − ˜ y
T¢
+ µtλo =0 , (31)
∂L
∂πt




− µt =0 . (32)




˜ yt − ˜ yT¢
. Using this result in (32)
yields








This equation gives us the optimal level of the indirect control which can
be mapped into the direct control (the nominal interest rate) by combining
this expression with equation (29). An explicit form will be given below.
Under strict inﬂation targeting we simply have πt = πT, while under strict
output stabilization we obtain ˜ yt =˜ yT. The intuition behind (33) is that if
the central bank cares about output, inﬂation will be allowed to over (under)
shoot the inﬂation target if output is below (above) target. The extent to
which this is allowed to happen is increasing in the central bank’s weight on
output stabilization.23
It is well-known in the closed economy literature that there are a variety
of strategies for implementing conditions like (33), and that these strategies
can have diﬀering implications for determinacy and learnability. We now
22For a discussion of the relative merits of dynamic programming and the Lagrange
method see Schaling (2001). For applications of the latter to a non-linear optimization
problem, and a regime switching model see Schaling (2004) and Bullard and Schaling
(2001), respectively.
23Similar intuition is provided in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999, p. 1672). If ˜ yT =
πT =0we obtain exactly Clarida et al (2002) equation (57).
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how these results may or may not be altered.
4.2.2 Two implementations
An expectations-based optimal rule
The rule Combining the ﬁrst-order condition (33) with equation (29)
we obtain
Et˜ yt+1 − σ
−1







(where rrt is the ex ante real interest rate rt − Etπt+1). This can be written
as








Et˜ yt+1 − ˜ y
T¢
.
Substituting for πt from equation (30) we obtain








Et˜ yt+1 − ˜ y
T¢
.
Eliminating output via (29) yields
rt − rrt = δ0,0 + δπ,0Etπt+1 + δy,0Et˜ yt+1 + δu,0ut (34)
























Equation (34) is an example of a targeting rule, as discussed for example in
Svensson (1999) and Woodford (2003, pp. 290-295). This rule is the Evans
and Honkapohja (2003) expectations-based optimal rule. By construction, it
implements what Evans and Honkapohja label ‘optimal discretionary policy’
in every period and for all values of private expectations.
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targets πT and yT to zero, the world economy can be written as
Zt = A0 + BEtZt+1 + XVt,
where Zt =[ ˜ yt,πt, ˜ y 
t,π 
t]




































Because B is block diagonal, determinacy conditions will be have to be met
















for the foreign economy. Expectational stability will again depend on the
real parts of the eigenvalues of this same matrix, and can be shown to hold
as well.
We conclude that this implementation of (33) generates determinacy and
learnability of worldwide rational expectations equilibrium with an optimal,
non-cooperative discretionary policy being followed in both countries. This
occurs because this implementation is known to work well in the closed econ-
omy case, the good performance does not break down with the extension to
the open economy model, and the policy does not introduce spillover eﬀects
that would otherwise not exist. Other implementations of (33) are known to
have poor properties, however, and we now turn to this case.
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The rule A fundamentals-based policy rule implementing (33) gener-
ates a diﬀerent reduced form. To obtain an optimal interest rate rule under
rational expectations conjecture a solution of the form
˜ yt = a1 + d1ut,
πt = a2 + d2ut,
for the domestic economy, with an analogous conjectured solution for the
foreign economy. The MSV solution has
¯ a1 =













σo(1 − βρ)+ρλo(δπ,0 − 1)
.
where δ0,0,δ π,0,δ y,0,δu,0 are given by (35) through (38) respectively. The
policy feedback rule is then
rt = ψ0 + ψuut + rrt, (39)
with




δπ,0 ¯ d2 + δy,0 ¯ d1
¢
+ δu,0.
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that this interest rate rule is associated with indeterminacy in the closed
economy case.24 The world economy can be written as
Zt = A0 + BEtZt+1 + XVt,






















Determinacy requires |a0| < 1 and |a1| < 1+a0 in v2 + a1v + a0 =0 ,
the characteristic equation for B11 and B22, respectively. For the domestic
economy (and analogously for the foreign economy),
a1 =
−(λo + σo + βσo)
σo
and a0 = β. The condition |a1| < 1+a0 is never met under maintained as-
sumptions and so worldwide equilibrium is indeterminate, as in the domestic
economy case discussed by Evans and Honkapohja (2003). The MSV solu-
tion will also be unstable in the learning dynamics. We conclude that the
method of implementing (33) will matter in the open economy case just as
it does in the closed economy.
4.2.3 Summary for discretionary non-cooperative policy
T h e r ea r eo t h e rp o s s i b l ei m p l e m e n t a t i o n so ft h eﬁrst order condition under
discretionary non-cooperative policy. All implementations we have seen have
the same feature, namely that they prod u c ew o r l ds y s t e m sw h i c ha r eb l o c k
diagonal. The conditions for determinacy and learnability will then have to
be met economy by economy. This is driven by the fact that under a non-
cooperative approach to optimal policy, each policymaker can approximate
24See for instance Woodford (1999, 2003) and Svensson and Woodford (2003).
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variables in its objective function.
As we have seen, block diagonality breaks down if policymakers put weight
on international variables in their policy rules, or, in a targeting approach, in
their objective function. That is exactly what happens should policymakers
in each country attempt to pursue the gains to cooperation which normally
exist in this model. We now turn to this issue.
4.3 Cooperative discretionary policy
4.3.1 Overview
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) study cooperation in the context of their
New Keynesian model and are thus part of what Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba
(2004) call second generation models of policy coordination. Canzoneri, et
al., state that the gains from coordination are larger in second generation
models than in ﬁrst generation models.25
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) show in their Proposition 3 that gains to
international policy cooperation will accrue to both countries when σ>1 and
each country follows a rule dictated by the solution to a joint optimization
problem. We now follow Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and discuss the
prospects for determinacy and learnability if each country attempts to pursue
the gains from cooperation.
4.3.2 The policy problem
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) deﬁne cooperation to mean that the two
c e n t r a lb a n k si nt h em o d e la g r e et om a x i m i z eaw e i g h t e da v e r a g eo ft h e
utility of the home and foreign households under discretion. The weights
are naturally γ and 1−γ. Both governments refrain from creating a surprise
appreciation, and hand out employment subsidies that just oﬀset the monop-
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t and ˜ y
 ,C
t are the output gaps deﬁned under cooperation as the devi-
ation, in percent, of output from the cooperative steady state level for the
domestic and foreign economy, respectively. The cooperative steady state
level of output is associated with ﬂexible prices in both countries and the
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The ﬁrst order conditions for this prob l e mc a nt h e nb ew r i t t e ni nt e r m so f
standard output gaps as























The rule Combining these conditions with (1) and (3) gives optimal co-
operative policy rules
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olistic competition distortion. The monetary authorities jointly maximize anwhere
ϑ =1 +




  =1 +
ξσ 
o (1 − ρ)
ρ
.
The dynamic system, determinacy, and learnability The world econ-
omy can be written as
Zt = A0 + BEtZt+1 + XVt,










o (ϑ − 1)
λo β − σ−1






o κoκ−1 (ϑ − 1)
0 −σ−1
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  − 1)
¸
.
Determinacy properties will again depend on the eigenvalues of the matrix
B. The lack of block diagonality indicates that policy in each country will
inﬂuence determinacy properties. The four eigenvalues of B are given by
v1,± =
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v2,± =








These eigenvalues are independent of γ, the degree of openness. This is
because the two economies are following a cooperative policy which takes






Unless the serial correlation in the shock is suﬃciently large, this cooperative
policy will generate indeterminacy.26
We use the baseline calibration with the addition of ξ =7 .88 implying
am a r k u po fa b o u t15 percent, and we report results for values of ρ.T h e
cutoﬀ v a l u ef o rt h es e r i a lc o r r e l a t i o np a r a m e t e ri sρc ≈ 0.165.27 Values less
than this will create indeterminacy given the baseline calibration. Should
the shock process become something more like white noise, optimal policy
cooperation implemented in this way will be associated with indeterminacy.
For determinate cases, we veriﬁed numerically at baseline parameter values
that expectational stability holds.
4.3.4 Summary for cooperative policy
Cooperation means that the two central banks have agreed to jointly pursue
an objective deﬁned over weighted world averages of key variables. The
implied policy rule will have each monetary authority responding to world
economic events. Policies are no longer inward-looking. Determinacy and
26This is a version of a similar result for the closed economy in Evans and Honkapohja
(2003).
27For σ =2 ,ρ c ≈ 0.28.
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weighted average of world monetary policy. This weighted average takes on
as p e c i ﬁc value, because the objectives weigh each economy appropriately by
γ.
We stress that there may be other implementations of optimal cooperative
policy which may or may not generate either determinacy or learnability.
One might wonder if full cooperation is really a good positive model for
world monetary policy. In the international policy arena, we seem to observe
a variety of strategies in play. So far in the paper we have only considered
certain types of symmetry in policy, but there are also interesting asymmetric
situations. We now turn to one of these.
5 A s y m m e t r yi nm o n e t a r yp o l i c y
5.1 An exchange rate peg
5.1.1 Overview
In this section we suppose the home country targets its nominal exchange
rate e vis-a-vis the foreign country. We assume the foreign economy sets
its monetary policy based on its own domestic considerations. The home
country gives up its domestic monetary autonomy in return for “importing
monetary stability” from the foreign, anchor country.
This is a leading example of an asymmetric exchange rate regime, as
only the anchor country’s variables matter for its interest rate (depending
on the nature of the policy adopted there), and the home country simply
s e t si t si n t e r e s tr a t et oe n s u r ei tr e a l i z e saﬁxed exchange rate. The home
country in setting policy takes foreign monetary conditions into account, but
the foreign country need not incorporate the home country’s conditions in
its own monetary policy stance. This arrangement is similar to the regimes
adopted by some European countries prior to economic and monetary union
and to the present peg of the Chinese renminbi to the U.S. dollar.
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The minimization is subject to
˜ yt = Et˜ yt+1 − σ
−1
o [rt − Etπt+1 − rrt], (41)
πt = βEtπt+1 + λo˜ yt + ut, (42)
_
rrt = σoEt∆¯ yt+1 + κoEt∆y
 
t+1,
ut = ρut−1 +  t,




st =( ˜ yt − ˜ y
∗
t)+¯ st.
For ease of exposition we normalize the initial levels of the nominal exchange
rate and terms of trade at zero (et−1 = st−1 =0 ) ,s ot h a t
et = st + πt − π
 
t. (43)
I nw h a tf o l l o w sw en o r m a l i z et h ee x c h a n g er a t et a r g e ta tz e r o( eT =0 ). From
(40) the ﬁrst-order condition then becomes et =0 , which combined with (43)
implies
st = −(πt − π
 
t). (44)
The intuition behind (44) is the following. The nominal exchange rate obeys
CPI-based purchasing power parity and, after appropriate normalization, is
given by et = πt − π 
t + st. In order to prevent ﬂuctuations in et, the home
central bank should manipulate the terms of trade st,w h i c hi tc a na ﬀect via
the domestic output gap, in such a way as to oﬀset the GDP deﬂator-based
inﬂation diﬀerential. Thus we have (44).
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w h i c hi nt u r ni sa ﬀected by the home nominal interest rate, the home central
bank should try to achieve a level of the home output gap given by




t − ¯ st. (45)
Equation (45) is obtained by substituting the expression for the terms of
trade into the ﬁrst-order condition and rearranging.
5.1.3 The policy rule
Substituting (42) into (45), we obtain the home country’s optimal monetary
policy rule in terms of its indirect control ˜ yt













(¯ st + ut). (46)
The home interest rate reaction function can be obtained by combining (46)
with (41) to obtain














u,0 (ut +¯ st), (47)



















The rule (47) describes the optimal home monetary reaction function that
implements its monetary policy of pegging the exchange rate to the foreign
anchor country.28
We substitute the home country’s policy rule (47) into (41). This implies
˜ yt = σ
−1














u,0 (ut +¯ st), (51)
Here the dependence of home’s economic outcomes on the foreign macro-
economy is evident from the presence of the terms π 
t and ˜ y 
t.




Working Paper Series No 611
April 20065.1.4 The dynamic system, determinacy, and learnability
Whether or not a ﬁxed exchange rate regime is compatible with determi-
nacy of worldwide rational expectations equilibrium depends on how the for-
eign, anchor country implements monetary policy, and on any international
spillover eﬀects on the home country. We make the assumption that the for-
eign, anchor country is inward-looking, and concerned only about reacting
to developments in its own economy. We proceed with the most straightfor-
ward assumption, namely that the foreign inﬂation country follows a simple
Taylor-type policy rule. This allows us to easily study cases where the for-
eign, anchor monetary authorities are pursuing policies either consistent or
inconsistent with determinacy and learnability of worldwide rational expec-
tations equilibrium.
The world economy can again be written in standard form. The matrix






where B22 is the matrix associated with a simple Taylor rule in use in the
foreign country. The eigenvalues there will depend on whether the foreign
country is following the open economy version of the Taylor principle or not,
as discussed earlier in the paper. The eigenvalues of B11 will also have to be
























We conclude that determinacy holds under maintained assumptions provided
the foreign, anchor monetary authorities are following the Taylor principle.
Learnability holds under the same conditions.
One may be able to imagine scenarios under which this result would break
down, if the foreign, anchor economy had some other policy. But this result
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exchange rate peg.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have developed results on determinacy and expectational stability for a
simple open economy New Keynesian model due to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2002). We used this model with an eye toward comparing the open economy
ﬁndings to known results for closed economies under similar assumptions.
We have shown that even for simple Taylor-type policy rules, open econ-
omy considerations will have quantitative eﬀects on determinacy and learn-
ability conditions. Closed economy analyses tend to understate the degree
of aggressiveness the policymaker must adopt to avoid indeterminacy and
expectational instability. Quantitative diﬀerences of this type are alluded to
by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and are in accord with the ﬁndings of
Llosa and Tuesta (2005).
When central banks are inward-looking–reacting to domestic variables
in their policy rules–our results indicate that determinacy and learnabil-
ity conditions for worldwide equilibrium must be met country by country.
This is true whether we are considering inward-looking instrument rules or
targeting rules which are implied by non-cooperative policy objectives. Opti-
mal policy will require an implementation, but the natural implementations
suggested in the closed economy literature imply the separability of determi-
nacy and learnability conditions across economies. We interpret this ﬁnding
as follows. If one country out of many adopts an instrument rule that is
inconsistent with determinacy and learnability, or one country out of many
adopts an implementation of an optimal policy which is inconsistent with de-
terminacy and learnability, then worldwide equilibrium will be indeterminate
and expectationally unstable. The remaining countries, even if they attempt
to be very aggressive in promoting determinacy and learnability, will not
have an impact on this facet of the world equilibrium. This might be viewed
as an undesirable aspect of inward-looking policies, even if they are judged
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‘optimal’ on other grounds.When monetary authorities are actively responding to international vari-
ables, our results indicate that determinacy and learnability conditions for
worldwide equilibrium are met by something akin to an average of world
monetary policy. This occurs for simple instrument rules which include in-
ternational elements, or for targeting rules where monetary authorities are
attempting to pursue cooperative policies to achieve the available gains. Op-
timal cooperative policy will also require an implementation, and the baseline
implementation from the literature may not be consistent with determinacy
and learnability. Still, inclusion of reactions to international variables al-
lows the monetary authorities from a suﬃciently large economy to mitigate
the threats of indeterminacy and expectational instability posed by a part-
ner country that is pursuing a poor policy, either through an ad hoc policy
or through an inadvertently bad implementation of an optimal policy. The
ability to inﬂuence these conditions may be viewed as a desirable aspect of
monetary policy in an open economy context.
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